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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v* : Case No. 910241 
TERI LIN GODDARD, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of murder in the second 
degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-203 (1990) (amended 1991). This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
!• Was the evidence of defendant's mens rea sufficient to 
support his conviction for second degree murder? 
"In reviewing a jury verdict to determine if it was based on 
sufficient evidence, [an appellate court] viewfs] the evidence 
presented and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the verdict. Where there is any evidence, 
including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, from 
which the findings of all the elements of the crime can be made 
beyond a reasonable doubt, [the] inquiry is complete and [the 
court] will sustain the verdict." State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 
285 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 1837 
(1990). Accord State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1992). 
2. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motions to 
arrest judgment or to dismiss? 
For a trial court to "substitute its judgment for that of the 
jury [and to arrest judgment], the verdict must be based on 
evidence 'so inherently improbable that no reasonable mind could 
believe it.'" State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1204 (Utah App. 
1991) (quoting State v. Mvers, 606 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1980) 
(Wilkins, J., concurring). 
Defendant's motion to dismiss is based on an insufficiency of 
the evidence argument. In such a case, this Court "will uphold the 
trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all 
inferences that can reasonably be drawn from it, [the Court] 
conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury 
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 
1989). 
3. Was the trial court correct in refusing to give a jury 
instruction that would have required the jury to agree unanimously 
on which alternative of second degree murder defendant had 
committed? 
"An appeal of the trial court's refusal to give a jury 
instruction presents a question of law. . • . [An appellate court] 
therefore review[s] the trial court's ruling under a correction of 
error standard, granting it no particular deference." State v. 
Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 658 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
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4. Did the trial court err by refusing to grant defendant's 
motion for a new trial, sought pursuant to rule 24(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the sole purpose of allowing an 
expert on blood spatter evidence to rebut the State's expert? 
"The decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of 
discretion with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a 
clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 
222 (Utah 1985). In general, an appellate court "will presume that 
the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the 
record clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 
530, 534-35 (Utah 1984). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the 
trial court's determination must be "beyond the limits of 
reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 
1992). 
5. Was defendant adequately represented at trial in accord 
with his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel? 
Review of this issue is based on a determination of whether 
counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether the 
deficient performance prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 
474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). Because the ineffectiveness claim is 
being presented for the first time on appeal, it should be reviewed 
on the record of the underlying trial as a question of law. See 
State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990) (amended 1991 ) l , governing 
murder in the second degree, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury 
to another, he commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death 
of another; 
(c) acting under circumstanced evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life, he 
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk 
of death to another and thereby causes the 
death of another; or 
(d) [felony murder]. 
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony of 
the first degree. 
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, governing 
motions for new trial, provides: 
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon 
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the rights of a party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second 
degree murder, as had been charged in the information (R. 110). 
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment, which was 
heard by the court and denied (R. 180). At the sentencing hearing 
which followed, defendant moved for a continuance, arguing that new 
evidence was becoming available to show that "the jury's verdict 
1
 The 1991 amendment to section 76-5-203 eliminated the 
reference to "second degree." This level of criminal homicide now 
is simply called "murder." 
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may have been based upon inaccurate evidence" (R. 179 at 4), The 
court denied the motion for a continuance (R. 179 at 9), sentenced 
defendant to five years to life in the Utah State Prison, and 
assessed fines and fees of $6750 (R. 127). Defendant then filed a 
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and 
surprise, as provided for in rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. After a hearing on the matter, the court 
denied this motion as well (R. 181 at 17). Defendant now appeals 
from her conviction for second degree murder. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Teri Lin Goddard spent the day of June 1, 1990, with 
her live-in boyfriend, Derek Hall, the victim of the murder for 
which she was convicted. They had invited friends to their home, 
where they drank and visited until about 5:00 p.m. (R. 177 at 379). 
In the early evening, defendant and Hall independently left their 
home and visited other friends and continued drinking (R. 177 at 
381-83). Eventually, they both ended up at the home of Frank 
Guitterez where a party was ongoing (R. 177 at 387; R. 176 at 145). 
After Hall left the party late in the evening, defendant and 
three other women became involved in an argument. Defendant 
testified that, in the course of the argument, one of the women 
threatened her with bodily harm. She stated that she was scared 
(R. 177 at 390-91). Soon thereafter, when Mr. Guitterez told 
defendant he didn't want any trouble at his house, she left the 
home (R. 176 at 118, 146; R. 177 at 389-91)-
Defendant was the only witness to the events that followed. 
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She ran home and began telling Hall about the incident at Mr. 
Guitterez's home (R. 177 at 394). While she was talking, she went 
into the kitchen and removed a fish fillet knife from the 
silverware drawer. She testified that she thought a confrontation 
with the women who had been at Mr. Guitterez's home was imminent 
and that she needed to protect herself (R. 177 at 391). Hall, a 
parolee who was violating his parole agreement, then "started 
holleringtf at defendant, presumably because he knew that a warrant 
for his arrest had been issued and that any interaction with the 
police flowing from the argument between the women could result in 
his return to prison (R. 177 at 396, 402). 
The hollering continued. Hall began hitting and pushing 
defendant, until eventually he grabbed her arms and pushed her 
backwards into a swivel rocking chair in the front room (R. 177 at 
397-98). Defendant was "laying [sic] on [her] back in the seat of 
the chair" with her head "just sort of upright" by the back of the 
seat cushion. Her pelvis was "just off the front of the cushion," 
and her knees were bent (R. 178 at 452). According to defendant, 
Hall was kneeling between defendant's legs, holding both of 
defendant's arms near the elbows (R. 178 at 399). Hall then 
shifted his grasp, so that both of his hands were securing 
defendant's hand that held the knife (R. 177 at 399). Defendant 
testified: "He just — like he leaned down on top of me, like he 
leaned on me, and then I remember, you know, I remember him looking 
at me and I was looking at him and then I remember him saying, what 
did you do, stab me in the heart" (R. 177 at 399). Hall then stood 
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up for a moment, leaned back down, and then fell to the floor (R. 
177 at 400). 
After seeing blood on Hall's bare chest, defendant realized 
that Hall was not playing a practical joke and that he had been 
stabbed (R. 177 at 401). She became hysterical and ran outside 
screaming for somebody to call the police (R. 177 at 402). Both 
defendant's neighbor and several police officers testified that 
defendant was hysterical for some time after the incident and that 
she repeatedly asked whether or not she had killed Hall (R. 176 at 
168, R. 177 at 177, 192, 231, 245-46). 
Dr. Scharon Schnittker, deputy assistant director for the Utah 
State Medical Examiner and a forensic pathologist, testified that 
the knife went "straight in" to a depth of approximately 2 7/8 
inches (R. 177 at 264). It punctured the aorta and caused the 
pericardial sac surrounding the heart to fill with blood, 
compressing the heart and causing Hall's death (R. 177 at 262-63). 
Dr. Schnittker opined that the straight, deep nature of the wound 
indicated that it was not accidental (R. 177 at 271); that "the 
wound was inflicted by a thrust of the knife into the body rather 
than the body falling on the knife" (R. 177 at 275); and that the 
knife "would have to be held extremely firmly" — "fixed in a vise 
or something like that" — to inflict the wound in the way 
defendant alleged (R. 177 at 275). She also testified that 
"because there was no blood coming from the wound down," it was 
unlikely that Hall "fell forward prone for any length of time* (R. 
177 at 274). 
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In rebuttal testimony, faced with a hypothetical mirroring 
defendant's account of the events, Dr. Schnittker was unwavering in 
her testimony that the scenario outlined by defendant was 
"extremely unlikely" because of "the lack of blood on either 
[Hall's] left hand or [the front of defendant's] pink sweatshirt" 
(R. 177 at 487, 489)- She also testified that if Hall had been 
kneeling and bracing defendant's hands as posited by the defense, 
she couldn't "see any plausible way why he >rould at that point lose 
balance and fall upon the knife. And certainly he would have had 
the ability to deflect the knife with his hand holding her hand" 
(R. 177 at 487) . 
The jury convicted defendant of second degree murder, as 
charged. 
Following the conviction, defendant filed a motion to arrest 
judgment, arguing that Dr. Schnittker's opinion testimony in 
rebuttal was incredible because, when presented with the defense's 
hypothetical, she clung resolutely to the opinions she expressed on 
direct examination (R. 180 at 1-2). The court denied the motion, 
reasoning that matters of credibility should be left to the 
prerogative of the jury (R. 180 at 8). 
At the sentencing hearing, defendant moved for a continuance 
and renewed the motion to arrest judgment, asserting that "the 
defense has become aware of newly discovered forensic evidence," 
namely a forensic blood expert, whose evaluation of the evidence 
might be contrary to the testimony of Dr. Schnittker (R. 179 at 3-
4). The court observed that the nature of the "new" evidence was 
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speculative at the time and that a post-conviction remedy would be 
more appropriate (R. 179 at 4). The court denied both motions (R. 
179 at 10). 
Defendant subsequently moved for a new trial. By that time, 
the forensic blood expert, Judith Bunker, had submitted an 
affidavit and report of analysis. In the affidavit, she concluded 
that the blood spatter evidence was consistent with defendant's 
explanation of what had occurred (R. 151 otf appendix A). Defendant 
argued that this "newly discovered evidence" in conjunction with 
the "surprise" of Dr. Schnittker testifying in rebuttal about the 
blood spatters2 warranted a new trial under rule 24(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court denied the motion, stating 
that "the affidavit in support of defendant's motion for a new 
trial is not of sufficient magnitude nor sufficiently inconsistent 
with the evidence as presented to the jury at the time to allow the 
court to consider that to be significantly different" (T. 181 at 
17). Defendant now appeals from her conviction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Three neighbors of defendant and one expert witness testified 
to facts from which the jury reasonably could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant had one of the culpable mental 
states necessary to sustain the verdict of second degree murder. 
2
 Defendant argued below that this testimony came as a 
surprise because Dr. Schnittker had not testified about the blood 
spatters at the preliminary hearing nor had she reviewed the 
evidence showing the blood stains prior to the day the trial began. 
On appeal, however, defendant has not relied upon surprise as a 
ground for granting a new trial, although surprise is peripherally 
mentioned in a footnote. See Br. of App. at 36-37 n.3. 
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The trial court dismissed the depraved indifference 
alternative within the second degree murder statute. This ruling 
was incorrect as a matter of law. Defendant is correct in her 
assertion that the mens rea in the first three variations is 
similar. In addition, the statute defines but a single crime. 
Under the facts of this casef no viable distinction exists to 
justify dismissing the third alternative. 
The law is well-settled that defendant was not entitled to a 
jury instruction that would have required it to agree unanimously 
on which alternative of second degree murder defendant had 
committed. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial because the allegedly "newly 
discovered evidence" was only cumulative in nature and was not such 
as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the 
case. 
Finally, defendant was not denied the effective assistance of 
counsel. First, even had counsel explored the blood spatter 
evidence earlier as defendant asserts she should have, and even had 
the testimony of the expert come in, the result of the trial would 
likely have been no different. The trial court so concluded in 
rejecting defendant's motion for a new trial after thoroughly 
reviewing the content of the expert's affidavit and report of 
analysis. 
Second, although defendant asserts that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the State's expert's 
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qualifications to testify about the blood spatters, she points to 
nothing in the record that brings the expert's qualifications into 
question. 
And, finally, defendant asserts that counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object when the prosecution asked defendant if she 
knew of any reason or motivation for each of three witnesses to lie 
about what they experienced on the evening of the murder. These 
questions were improper. Defendant's response in one instance, 
however, served to impeach the witness's credibility. In the other 
two instances, the error was simply not prejudicial; it was not 
significant enough to undermine confidence in the verdict. 
For these reasons, defendant's conviction for second degree 
murder should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S MENS REA WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT OF 
GUILTY ON THE CHARGE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER, 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(1) 
(1990). 
In order to support a finding of guilt on the charge of murder 
in this case, the State must have adduced evidence that would have 
allowed the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
had one of the culpable mental states specified in the relevant 
sections of the second degree murder statute. Specifically, 
defendant must have "intentionally or knowingly" caused Derek 
Hall's death or, "intending to cause serious bodily injury" to 
Hall, she must have committed "an act clearly dangerous to human 
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life that cause[d] the death of" Hall. Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-5-
203(l)(a), -(b) (1990). 
The element of intent can be proven by circumstantial 
evidence. "Indeed, unless a confession is made by the defendant 
concerning intent, or unless the court is somehow able to open the 
mind of the defendant to examine his motivations, intent is of 
necessity proven by circumstantial evidence." State v. James, 819 
P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991). By its very4 nature, circumstantial 
evidence requires that inferences be drawn from other facts. These 
other facts, in most cases, involve "evidence of the injury by 
which the victim died or the act which caused the death. The 
inference is made that the natural consequences of that act were 
intended to occur." Id., at 790. 
In this case, defendant's version of the facts boiled down to 
a fatal mishap in which Hall accidentally impaled himself on a 
knife that defendant had procured for reasons having nothing to do 
with Hall. If the jury found this scenario to be incredible, then 
the following inferences reasonably could be drawn from testimony 
adduced at trial. 
-Christine Grogan, a neighbor of defendant, testified that on 
the evening of June 1st, she saw defendant and heard her scream at 
Frank Guitterez's truck, "Don't you come back here or I'll kill 
you. You stay the hell away from me" (R. 176 at 90). Grogan did 
not know at the time that Hall was in the truck, nor did she think 
anything of the incident at the time. Inference: Defendant was 
angry enough with someone to make a death threat. The fact that 
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Hall was in the truck and Grogan didn't know it may render her 
testimony all the more credible. 
-Frank Guitterez testified that around 7;00 p.m., he and Hall 
drove in Guiterrez's truck to fill it with gas and to buy more beer 
(R. 176 at 110-111). He also testified that, during the party at 
his house, defendant intentionally placed Guitterez's hands on her 
breasts, in full view of Hall (R. 176 at 116). Inferences: Hall 
was in the truck when Christine Grogan heard defendant scream her 
threat. At the party, defendant was attempting to make Hall 
jealous or somehow "get back" at him. There was some sort of 
ongoing altercation or disagreement between defendant and Hall. 
-Beth Steed, a neighbor of defendant, testified that in 
the early morning hours of June 2nd, she was awakened by loud male 
and female voices coming from the Goddard home (R. 176 at 155-56). 
Inference: Defendant and Hall were arguing or fighting. 
-Dr. Scharon Schnittker, the forensic pathologist, testified 
that the knife went "straight in" (R. 177 at 264) and that a 
"moderate amount" of "directed force" was necessary to make such a 
wound (R. 177 at 274). In her opinion, "the wound was inflicted by 
a thrust of the knife into the body rather than the body falling on 
the knife" (R. 177 at 275). She further opined that the wound was 
not consistent with the victim falling forward on the knife 
"because the knife would deflect out of the hand or probably cut 
the hand of the person holding the knife" (R. 177 at 275). 
Inference: Defendant stabbed Hall. 
Looking at all of the above evidence together, if the jury 
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chose not to believe defendant's version of what happened, it could 
have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant either 
intended to kill or seriously injure Hall or knew that the natural 
and probable consequence of thrusting a knife straight into his 
chest near his heart would be death. See State v. Wardle, 564 P. 2d 
764, 766 (Utah 1977). 
Defendant makes much of her hysteria following the stabbing, 
asserting that her "actions immediately following the stabbing of 
Mr. Hall were totally inconsistent with an intent to kill that the 
State hypothesized she possessed mere minutes before" (Br. of 
Appellant at 24). Defendant's state of mind following the crime, 
however, does not show her state of mind prior to the event. State 
v. James, 819 P.2d at 789. Referring to flight or concealment as 
the act analogous to defendant's hysteria in this case, the James 
Court stated: " [A]lthough flight or concealment may give rise to an 
inference of a guilty conscience and therefore an inference of 
guilt, that inference may not be built upon to create an inference 
of the defendant's intent before the act was committed." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Certainly the evidence before the jury was contradictory. But 
"[t]he existence of contradictory evidence does not warrant 
disturbing the jury's verdict. The finder of fact is free to weigh 
the conflicting evidence presented and to draw its own 
conclusions." State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 781-82 (Utah 1986) 
(citations omitted). On appeal, this Court will accord deference 
to the jury's conclusions, leaving them undisturbed "so long as 
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some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's 
findings." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990)- In 
this case, the evidence adduced at trial along with the reasonable 
inferences that grow from that evidence were "not so inherently 
improbable that a reasonable jury could not have found defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. James, 819 P. 2d at 
793. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
DISMISSING THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
ALTERNATIVE WITHIN THE SECOND DEGREE MURDER 
STATUTE. NONETHELESS, THE COURT PROPERLY 
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS, FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT, OR TO ARREST JUDGMENT. 
Defendant argues that because the trial court dismissed the 
depraved indifference alternative within the second degree murder 
statute, it should also have granted either defendant's motions to 
dismiss or for a directed verdict, made during trial, or 
defendant's motion to arrest judgment, made after trial. 
Defendant's argument is based on the theory that the first three 
alternatives within the second degree murder statute describe a 
continuum of mental states, with each alternative incorporating the 
mens rea of the alternatives following it. Under this theory, if 
the evidence was insufficient to allow the depraved indifference 
alternative to go to the jury, it would also necessarily be 
insufficient to allow the first two alternatives to go to the jury. 
The state does not take issue with defendant's interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (a)-(c). Under the facts of this 
case, the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the 
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depraved indifference variation of second degree murder. 
The court gave no rationale for its dismissal of the depraved 
indifference variation (R. 178 at 409). Counsel's argument before 
the court on the motion to dismiss, however, may indicate what the 
court considered in making its ruling. The argument dealt first 
with the meaning of "depraved indifference to human life," the 
objective element of the third variation. State v. Standiford, 769 
P.2d 254, 261 (Utah 1988). It then focused on the mental state 
necessary for depraved indifference.3 
Defendant first argued that depraved indifference meant "the 
kind of situation in which, as we learned in law school, the person 
fires into the crowd of people" or where "the defendant drove up 
next to another person in an adjacent car, took a shotgun, and 
fired into the passing car" or where someone "places the bomb on a 
crowded bus, or in an amphitheater full of people" or where "the 
defendant stabbed the decedent 107 times" (R. 177 at 330, 331, 
335). Defendant asserted that the facts of this case are somehow 
different, but failed to articulate the specific nature of the 
difference (R. 177 at 330). Second, relying on State v. Fontana, 
680 P. 2d 1042 (Utah 1984), and State v. Standiford, counsel 
asserted that no prima facie showing had been made that defendant 
"was an actor acting with knowledge that her act was likely to 
create this grave risk of death" (R. 177 at 336). In essence, she 
put at issue the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the "knowing" 
3
 The trial court argument on the motion to dismiss is 
included as appendix C to this brief. All record cites referring 
to the argument can be found in this appendix. 
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element necessary for depraved indifference. 
First, differentiating the facts of this case from the cases 
cited by defendant creates a distinction without a difference. As 
the prosecutor stated: MAlthough there may be a traditional, 
perhaps a sort of common sort of circumstance that [sic] this 
theory may be used, it is not to say it's exclusive in its 
application, that again, when a person thrusts a knife into another 
person's chest to the degree that this knife was thrust, and the 
type of knife that it was, and the location it was thrust, that 
evidence is a depraved indifference to human life" (R. 177 at 333-
34). 
The facts in State v. Russell, 733 P. 2d 162 (Utah 1987), a 
case in which all three alternatives of second degree murder were 
appropriately considered by the jury, are most closely analogous to 
the facts of this case. There, defendant knew the victims, was 
armed, and was engaged in conversation with them in their home just 
prior to the shootings. It was not a situation, as in the depraved 
indifference cases cited by the defense, where defendant targeted 
an innocent stranger or engaged in a random or wanton act such as 
shooting into a crowd. Yet on the facts of Russell, the Court 
concluded that "the evidence supports the finding that defendant 
killed his victims with one of the mens rea and under the 
circumstances in our second degree murder statute, section 76-5-
203." Russell, 733 P.2d at 169 (emphasis added). 
Second, as to the issue of mental state, this Court has stated 
that the mental states required to prove the single crime defined 
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by the second degree murder statute are "similar." "[C]ulpability 
arises either from an actual intent to kill or from a mental state 
that is essentially equivalent thereto — such as intending 
grievous bodily injury and knowingly creating a very high risk of 
death. The risk of death in the latter two instances must be so 
great as to evidence such an indifference to life as to be 
tantamount to that evidenced by an intent to kill." State v. 
Standiford, 769 P. 2d at 259. The various Cental states within the 
statute, then, all have in common "a very high degree of moral 
culpability." Id. 
Prior to authoring the majority opinion in Standiford/ Justice 
Stewart explored the mental state issue under section 76-5-
203(1)(a)-(c) in a concurrence in Russell. There, referring to the 
mental states delineated in the first three alternatives of the 
second degree murder statute, he stated: 
[E]ach one . . . amounts to a varied form of 
depraved indifference murder. Certainly, 
intentionally causing death demonstrates 
depraved indifference to the value of the life 
taken.. . .Therefore, a juror who finds that a 
defendant intentionally or knowingly committed 
a homicide must necessarily find depraved 
indifference because a defendant who intends 
to kill is aware that his conduct creates a 
grave risk of death. 
State v. Russell, 733 P.2d at 173-74 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
Standiford, read in conjunction with the Russell concurrence, 
then, leads to the conclusion that not only is the mental state 
described in the depraved indifference alternative quite similar to 
the mental states described in the first two alternatives, but also 
that it is actually included within them. In this case, then, 
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where the factual scenario falls within the ambit of the kind of 
crime described by depraved indifference and where the mental state 
to prove the crime has been established, it becomes clear that the 
trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the depraved 
indifference variation/ 
Nonetheless, the trial court did not err in denying 
defendant's motions to dismiss, for a directed verdict, or to 
arrest judgment. Because the evidence was*sufficient to support a 
conviction under one of the first two alternatives, it was 
necessarily sufficient to sustain a conviction under the depraved 
indifference variation, had the court not dismissed it. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO REQUIRE THE JURY 
TO UNANIMOUSLY AGREE UPON ONE OF TWO STATUTORY 
SECTIONS REGARDING THE MENS REA NECESSARY FOR 
SECOND DEGREE MURDER UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-5-203 (1990) DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT'S RIGHT 
TO A UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICT WHERE THE STATUTE 
DEFINED ONLY A SINGLE CRIME. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to 
send two separate verdict forms, one each for the first and second 
statutory alternatives, to the jury. The effect of separate 
verdict forms would be to require unanimity from the jury as to the 
4
 Defendant argues that this error requires reversal. Once 
depraved indifference was dismissed, however, the jury was faced 
with a considerably more difficult determination. Rather than 
being able to find defendant guilty of depraved indifference, the 
jury had to meet the arguably higher standards of intent to kill or 
intent to inflict serious bodily harm. In the event the jury could 
not do that, acquittal would have been the only other available 
option. Thus, a close examination of the circumstances at trial 
reveals that defendant actually benefited from the dismissal of the 
depraved indifference alternative. 
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mens rea of defendant when she committed the crime. Recognizing 
that such unanimity as to mens rea would be appropriate only if the 
statute defined more than one crime, defendant points to the 
court's dismissal of the depraved indifference alternative as 
evidence that the three alternatives are not closely enough related 
to be considered a single crime. 
The law is well-settled on this question by State v. Russell. 
In that case, defendant claimed that his second degree murder 
conviction was not based on a unanimous jury verdict because "the 
jury had been instructed under a general verdict form and had been 
told that it could find defendant guilty of 'any one of the three 
circumstances'" defined by the statute. State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 
162/ 165 (Utah 1987). In affirming the conviction, the court 
recognized the Sullivan rule, which states: 
"It is not necessary that a jury, in order to 
find a verdict, should concur in a single vi€jw 
of the transaction disclosed by the evidence. 
If the conclusion may be justified upon either 
of two interpretations of the evidence, the 
verdict cannot be impeached by showing that a 
part of the jury proceeded upon one 
interpretation and part upon the other." 
Id. (quoting People v. Sullivan, 65 N.E. 989, 989-90 (Ct. App. 
1903) (citation omitted)). Applying Sullivan, the court ruled that 
jury unanimity was not required as to the exact mens rea of the 
defendant where, as in the second degree murder statute, more than 
one mens rea is described.5 State v. Russell, 733 P.2d at 167. 
5
 In adopting this rule, the court agreed with the reasoning 
of other courts around the country. For example, the court cited 
with approval the observations of the Supreme Court of Alaska which 
stated: "Rejection of the Sullivan rule would . • . result in juror 
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There is, however, a stated limitation to the Sullivan rule. 
"If the statute under which the defendant is convicted actually 
defines more than one crime and not merely one crime which may be 
committed in several different ways, the defendant is entitled to 
jury unanimity on which crime he is guilty of committing." Ld. at 
166-67. 
Defendant seizes on this language, urging this Court to find 
that section 76-5-203 defines more than 6ne crime. In Russell, 
however, defendant was convicted under section 76-5-203, the same 
statute at issue here. Referring to that statute, the Court 
plainly stated: "It is clear . . . that only one crime is defined 
— that being second degree murder. Thus, we do not have in this 
case the problem of several distinct crimes being defined in a 
single statute. . . . Under the virtually unanimous case law which 
we have discussed above, defendant was not entitled to unanimity on 
(a), (b), or (c)." Id. at 167. 
As a matter of law, defendant was not entitled to a jury 
instruction that would have required it to agree unanimously on 
which alternative of second degree murder defendant had committed. 
disagreement over semantics in many cases in which they unanimously 
agree that the defendant committed the wrongful deed. . . . By 
requiring semantic uniformity we encourage overcomplicated 
instructions and hung juries in cases in which the jurors actually 
agree upon the defendant's guilt." State v. Russell, 733 P.2d at 
167 (quoting State v. James, 698 P.2d 1161, 1165 {Alaska 1985}). 
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POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
PURSUANT TO RULE 24(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
A court may grant a new trial in the interest of justice if 
there was any impropriety that had a substantially adverse effect 
on the rights of a party. Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). In this case, 
defendant asserts that the court should have granted her a new 
trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. The newly 
discovered evidence in this case was an affidavit and report of 
analysis from Dr. Judith Bunker, a blood spatter expert. 
Newly discovered evidence must meet three criteria in order to 
constitute grounds for a new trial: 
(1) It must be such as could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered and 
produced at trial; 
(2) it must not be merely cumulative; 
(3) it must be such as to render a different 
result probable on the retrial of the case. 
State v. James, 819 P.2d at 793 (citations omitted). The Court has 
also stated that •• [g]enerally, newly discovered impeachment 
evidence does not ordinarily warrant a new trial." State v. 
Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). 
In denying the motion for a new trial, the trial court 
stated: 
The court finds that the motion for a new 
trial should be and the same is herein denied. 
That the evidence presented to the jury was 
sufficient and the affidavit in support of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial is not of 
sufficient magnitude nor sufficiently 
inconsistent with the evidence as presented to 
the jury at the time to allow the court to 
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consider that to be significantly different. 
R. 181 at 17. While the trial court apparently did not follow the 
three-point analysis outlined by this Court in James, the import of 
its ruling is that the testimony of Dr. Bunker was not sufficiently 
dissimilar to what had already been adduced at trial to qualify as 
newly discovered evidence. The affidavit and report, in the 
language of James, were "merely cumulative" of testimony the jury 
had already considered.6 Because the trial court implicitly found 
that at least one of the three criteria had not been met, denial of 
defendant's motion should stand absent an abuse of discretion. See 
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) ("decision to 
grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion with the trial 
court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of 
discretion"). 
In Dr. Bunker's report of analysis, she made six "observations 
and conclusions" drawn from the evidence she had examined (R. 155 
or appendix B). During the hearing on the new trial motion, the 
prosecutor reviewed Dr. Bunker's report of analysis point-by-point, 
stating, "I have reviewed this report from Ms. Bunker and I really 
do not see how it contradicts . . . any of that testimony of Dr. 
Schnittker." R. 181 at 8. In essence, the prosecutor believed 
that the factual findings made by Dr. Bunker were not inconsistent 
with what had been brought forth already at trial. 
In her affidavit, Dr. Bunker concluded "that the blood spatter 
6
 And, as such, the clear implication is that the testimony 
would be unlikely "to render a different result probable in the 
retrial of the case." State v. James, 819 P.2d at 793. 
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evidence is consistent with the trial testimony and explanation of 
Teri Lynn [sic] Goddard and inconsistent with the theory argued by 
the State's attorney and the trial testimony of Dr. Sharon [sic] 
Schnittker." R. 151 or appendix A. The court questioned the basis 
for this conclusion in light of the prosecutor's observation that 
Dr. Bunker's factual findings were not inconsistent with the 
state's theory of the case (R. 181 at 13-14). The defense 
responded that Dr. Bunker's conclusion referred to three areas in 
which her findings supported defendant's version of the events 
rather than the state's: 1) that Hall was kneeling, rather than 
standing, at the time of the stabbing; 2) that Hall's blood could 
have dripped onto the back of defendant's shirtsleeve rather than 
onto its front; and 3) that the blood on the arm of the chair 
corroborated defendant's statement that Hall fell forward on the 
knife, pulled back, then fell forward again, depositing the blood 
on the arm of the chair, before finally falling backwards onto the 
floor. (R. 181 at 14-15). 
Dr. Bunker's testimony is not "newly discovered evidence." It 
is, instead, impeachment evidence, aimed at discrediting the 
testimony of Dr. Schnittker, which does no more than add a slightly 
different, non-dispositive slant to the evidence already before the 
jury. Because this evidence is primarily cumulative, it does not 
rise to the level required by rule 24(a) and cannot form the basis 
for a new trial. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion. Its decision was within 
"the limits of reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 
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239-40 (Utah 1992) (to constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial 
court's determination must be "beyond the limits of 
reasonability"). See also Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P. 2d 530, 534-35 
(Utah 1984) (an appellate court "will presume that the discretion 
of the trial court was properly exercised unless the record clearly 
shows the contrary"). 
POINT FIVE 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE. 
HER PERFORMANCE WAS NOT DEFICIENT; NOR WAS 
DEFENDANT IN ANY WAY PREJUDICED BY COUNSEL'S 
REPRESENTATION. 
Defendant claims she was denied effective assistance of 
counsel at trial. An ineffective assistance claim generally 
presents a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). However, when as here the issue is 
presented for the first time on appeal, without an evidentiary 
hearing having been conducted below, the ineffectiveness claim 
presents a question of law reviewed on the record of the underlying 
trial. See State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
The two-prong test for assessing effectiveness of counsel is 
well-settled, following the requirements of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, defendant must show that 
counsel's performance was deficient. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182, 186 (Utah 1990). To do this, defendant must identify specific 
acts or omissions which, under the circumstances of the particular 
case, demonstrate that "'counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.'" IcL (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 688). The court indulges in the 
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presumption "'that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance. . ..'" Id. 
Second, defendant must "affirmatively show that a reasonable 
probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the result 
would have been different." State v. Lovell, 758 P. 2d 909, 913 
(Utah 1988). This second prong is more commonly known as the 
prejudice requirement and "is comparable to the standard that [the 
Court] appl[ies] as the harmless error standard of Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 30(a). . .."7 State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 
n.15 (Utah 1989). If the reviewing court can determine that the 
claimed error did not prejudicially influence the outcome of the 
trial, then it need not decide if counsel's performance was 
defective. JEd. at 118-19. 
Defendant here claims three errors. First, defendant asserts 
that her counsel was ineffective because she failed to investigate 
the issue of blood spatters on the arm of the chair, an issue that 
was momentarily touched upon at the preliminary hearing. Counsel's 
failure to do so, however, did not prejudice defendant. At the 
hearing on defendant's new trial motion, the court reviewed Dr. 
Bunker's affidavit and report of analysis thoroughly and concluded 
that the testimony Dr. Bunker would have brought to trial was not 
"sufficiently inconsistent with the evidence as presented to the 
jury" to warrant a new trial (R. 181 at 17). In essence, the trial 
7
 Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
governing errors and defects, states: "Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded." 
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court found that the proferred expert testimony concerning the 
blood spatters, which presumably would have been the result of any 
further investigation by defense counsel, would not have "had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party*" Utah R. 
Crim. P. 24(a). Thus, even had counsel further explored the matter 
of blood spatters, the probability was not reasonable that the 
result of the trial would have been different. The second prong of 
the ineffectiveness test was not met. 
Second, defendant asserts that her counsel was ineffective 
because she failed to challenge Dr. Schnittker's qualifications as 
an expert on blood spatter evidence. Defendant points to nothing 
in the record, however, that would draw Dr. Schnittker's 
qualifications into question. Absent some indication of limited 
qualifications, defendant's assertion on appeal is nothing more 
than speculation. Trial counsel's silence on the matter certainly 
can as easily be interpreted as tacit recognition that Dr. 
Schnittker was qualified to testify as it can be to the contrary. 
Under such circumstances, defendant has wholly failed to meet the 
prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness test. Mere speculation will 
not suffice to show a reasonable probability that the jury's 
verdict would have been different had defendant's counsel 
questioned Dr. Schnittker's qualifications. State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
Finally, defendant argues that her trial counsel was 
ineffective because she failed to object when the prosecution asked 
defendant if she knew of "any reason or motivation" for each of 
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three witnesses to lie about what they experienced on the evening 
of Derek Hall's death (R. 178 at 447, 448, 449). Defendant asserts 
that these questions had a "chilling effect,•' diminishing 
defendant's credibility and bolstering that of the three witnesses, 
all of whose testimony went to the issue of intent. Br. of App. at 
42. Plainly, the questions were improper. State v. Emmett, 839 
P. 2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992). The focus for ineffectiveness of 
counsel purposes, however, is whether they prejudicially influenced 
the outcome of the trial. 
While the purpose of the questions was likely to diminish 
defendant's credibility, in one instance defendant's response 
served to impeach the witness's credibility. In response to the 
prosecutor's question about why Frank Guitterez would lie about his 
version of the events, defendant responded: "I have no idea what 
they do. They get so drunk down there, they do all kinds of other 
stuff down there" (R. 178 at 449-50). Defendant impeached 
Guitterez by letting the jury know that Guitterez drank 
excessively; that the party at his house was not an anomaly; and 
she further implied that he may not have been accurate in his 
testimony because of his excessive drinking. In this instance, 
then, the answer served a purpose quite different from what the 
prosecutor may have contemplated with the question. Certainly, the 
question did not prejudice the outcome of the case for defendant. 
As to the other two witnesses, it is difficult to imagine how 
two simple "no" responses from defendant, indicating that she knew 
of no particular reason for the witnesses to lie, would in and of 
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themselves undeirmine defendant's credibility in the minds of the 
jurors to the extent that the result of the trial would have been 
different had the questions not been asked. The error in asking 
the question of two witnesses was simply not significant enough to 
create a "probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the 
outcome." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d at 187 (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 694). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction for second degree murder. 
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REPORT OF ANALYSIS 
• RECONSTRUCTION 
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• INTERROGATORIES 
•TRIAL EXHIBITS 
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• WORKSHOPS 
TO: 
FROM: 
DATE: 
REFERENCE: 
SUBJECT: 
CIRCUMSTANCES: 
Brooke Wells, Trial Counsel 
Salt lake Legal Defender Association 
Judith L. Bunker, Forensic Consultant 
April 14, 1991 
State v Teri Goddard 
Case No. 901901103FS 
Derek Hall, Deceased 6/2/90 
Subject found dead from stab wound of 
chest. Study photographs and other 
evidence to establish position(s) of 
persons and objects during and following 
bloodshed. 
Original and Supplementary Police 
Reports, Salt Lake City Police Dept. 
Autopsy Protocol - Dr. Schnittker 
10 color photographs, scene & morgue 
Trial testimony - Dr. Schnittker 
Remainder of trial transcript 
Evidence as follows: 
Exhibit 27-S - Sweatshirt 
28-S - Bluejearns 
29-S - Bluejeans 
16-S - Swivel Rocker 
NOTE: Case file was submitted to this office by Investigator 
Dennis Couch on November 26, 1990. The clothing and chair 
were examined at the Salt Lake City Courthouse on December 4, 
1991. The complete trial transcript was submitted to this 
Office on March 28, 1991. 
EVIDENCE 
EXAMINED: 
CASE SUMMARY: 
Subject, Derrick Hall, was found dead on the living room 
floor of his residence on June 2, 1990, having suffered a 
stab wound to the chest. This incident occurred following an 
altercation between the subject and his roommate, Teri Lin 
Goddard. 
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AUTOPSY: 
Cause of death is a single stab wound to the chest. The 
wound track is front to back and horizontal and slightly 
right to left. This wound penetrated the anterior ascending 
aorta, producing a cardiac tamponade. A significant finding 
was a superficial cut at the base of the left second finger. 
Toxicology studies revealed a blood alcohol level of 0.16 mg% 
PHOTOGRAPHS: 
The photographs describe bloodshed confined to the overturned 
rocker and the body. The rocker is seen lying on its back. 
It was reportedly repositioned by rescue personnel. 
Subsequent photographs of the upright chair describe 
bloodstaining of the right armrest. (See examination) The 
body is lying supine with both knees bent toward the torso. 
There is blood flow upward from the wound, associated with 
the subject's descent to the floor. There is smearing or 
smudging of blood around the wound site. The hands appear to 
be free of bloodstaining. 
CLOTHING: 
27-S Sweatshirt: This is a melon colored sweatshirt, 
Tultex brand, size small, 50% cotton 50% 
acrylic. Blood stains are confined to 
the back of the right sleeve. The oval 
to elliptical appearing stains are 
directed laterally and downward. They 
range in size from 6 mm to 10 mm in 
diameter representing blood flow from 
above. Two larger stains measuring 
approximately 20 mm have been smeared 
while wet. 
28-S Bluejearns: These blue jearns, size 34, were removed 
from Teri Goddard. There are two oval 
appearing stains on right lower leg, 10-
11" above the hemline, measuring 5mm to 
6mm in diameter. Otherwise, the front of 
the jeans are free of staining. 
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The back of the jeans contain transfer 
patterns. There are elliptical and 
linear stains on the right hip which 
correspond to stains seen on the rocker 
arm. There are elliptical and linear 
stains seen on the left hip which also 
correspond to the stained rocker arm. 
The right lower leg contains circular to 
oval appearing transfter stains associated 
with smudging which also correspond to 
the stains seen on the rocker arm. 
29-S Bluejeans: These bluejeans were removed from the 
body. There are no labels. A total of 9 
stains are observed on the front of 
the left lower leg 12 - 15" above the 
hem. One stain measures 20 mm. with the 
remainder ranging in size from 3 - 7 mm. 
These stains were not visible in the 
photographs. These stains represent 
blood dropped from above. 
16-S Chair: This gold colored stuffed swivel rocker 
measures 17" from floor to cushion, 6" 
from cushion to top of arm rest, 28" from 
cushion to top of backrest and is 28" 
wide. 
The front of the right arm rest is 
stained by blood flow from above and 
liquid blood in direct contact with the 
fabric. These stains are associated with 
smudging or swiping while the blood is 
still wet. The liquid blood transfer 
continues across the inner arm, breaking 
into droplets toward the backrest 
describing a cast-off pattern from front 
to back, laterally. The inner fabric of 
the cushion below the armrest is also 
stained. 
NOTE: Color photographic slides were taken to document 
bloodstain evidence on clothing and rocker. 
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CONCLUSIONS: The following conclusions are based solely 
upon the evidence provided. There is no report that serology 
studies were conducted on any of these items. Considering 
that this incident involved only one blood source, the 
following conclusions and observations are submitted: 
1. Subject was directly above and in contact with the front 
of the right armrest when blood flowed from his wound, 
prior to falling back onto the floor4. 
2. The stains located on the inner armrest near the 
backrest indicate the rocker was on its back when this 
bloodshed occurred. 
3. The location of the rocker stains along with the final 
body position strongly suggest the subject was on his 
knees when the wound was inflicted. This is also 
suggested by the presence of flow on subject's left 
lower pant leg. 
4- Ms. Goddard was in the rocker when bloodshed occurred. 
Her right arm was in front of her when blood flowed onto 
the back of her sleeve from above. 
5. She removed herself from the rocker by climbing over the 
right armrest, transferring blood stains and patterns 
onto the back of her jeans. 
6. There is no bloodstain evidence to suggest that blood 
spurted or otherwise projected from the wound site at 
any point following the infliction of the wound« 
Respectfully submitted, 
Judith L. Bunker 
Forensic Consultant 
APPENDIX C 
MS. WELLS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. YOUR HONOR, 
IF I MAY APPROACH THE BENCH? I HAVE COPIES OF SOME CASES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: YES, YOU MAY. 
MS. WELLS: YOUR HONOR, PARTICULARLY IF I MAY 
JUST DIRECT THE COURT'S ATTENTION TO, I THINK IT'S THE 
SECOND CASE IN THAT PACKET, WHICH IS STATE OF UTAH V. VIC 
FONTANA. 
JUDGE YOUNG: YES. 
MS. WELLS: ALL RIGHT. YOUR HONOR, THE DEFENSE 
WOULD MOVE AT THIS TIME TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION IN TOTAL 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS. THE STATE 
HAS CHARGED MS. GODDARD WITH HAVING INTENTIONALLY OR KNOW-
INGLY COMMITTED THE HOMICIDE WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH 
OF MR. HALL. IN ORDER FOR THEM TO PREVAIL ON EITHER OF 
THOSE TWO THEORIES AND, IN FACT, ON ANY THEORY, THE STATE, 
AT THIS POINT IN TIME, MUST HAVE ESTABLISHED PRIMA FACIE, 
THAT MEANS, ON ITS FACE, EVIDENCE THAT WOULD SUSTAIN A 
FINDING OF AN INTENTIONAL OR KNOWING HOMICIDE. AND I FEEL 
THAT UNDER THE EVIDENCE THAT HAS COME FORTH UP TO THIS 
TIME, PARTICULARLY THE CONFESSIONS OF DR. SCHNITTKER THAT, 
IN FACT, THIS MAY HAVE NOT BEEN AN INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE--
SHE WOULD NOT SAY THAT IT WAS AN INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE--
AND HER AGREEMENT DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION WITH THE HYPO-
THETICAL MANNER IN WHICH THE DEATH COULD HAVE OCCURRED, 
THAT BEING PARTICULARLY WHERE THE VICTIM IS ON HIS KNEES 
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AND OVER THE DEFENDANT IN A SUPERIOR TYPE OF POSITION WITH 
THE KNIFE HELD IN A STEADY, FIXED POSITION, THAT AN ACCI-
DENTAL COMING FORWARD ON THAT KNIFE WHICH RESULTED IN THE 
DEATH IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT THE STATE HAS NOT. ESTAB-
LISHED ON ITS FACE THAT THIS WAS AN INTENTIONAL AND/OR 
KNOWING INFLICTION OF A WOUND. 
I WOULD ALSO CALL THE COURT'S ATTENTION TO THE 
MEDICAL EVIDENCE WHICH INDICATES<THAT IT WAS NOT AS MR. 
YBARRA ORIGINALLY INDICATED, A VIOLENT THRUST TO THE HEART 
THAT CAUSED THE DEATH, BUT RATHER, WHAT WE'VE DETERMINED 
IS THAT THE DEATH WAS CAUSED BY AN INJURY WHICH WENT BETWEEN^ 
OR INTO THE CARTILAGE NEXT TO THE RIB ON THE RIGHT SIDE 
OF THE CHEST, NOT DOWN THE CENTER OF THE CHEST BUT TO THE 
RIGHT SIDE OF THE CHEST WHEREIN THE PERI--THE LUNG WAS 
CLIPPED, THE PERICARDIAL SAC WAS CLIPPED, AND THE AORTA 
WAS CLIPPED CAUSING THE WOUND. 
NOW, UNDER THE DEFINITIONS OF INTENTIONAL OR 
KNOWING, A PERSON MUST HAVE INTENDED AN ACT TO CAUSE DEATH 
OR DONE THE ACT KNOWINGLY AND KNOWING THAT THAT ACT WOULD 
CONSTITUTE THE LIKELY RESULT, WHICH WAS DEATH. I DON'T 
THINK THAT THERE IS ANY EVIDENCE THAT HAS BEEN PRESENTED 
BY THE STATE AT THIS POINT IN TIME WHICH INDICATES, FIRST 
OF ALL, THAT IT WAS HER ACT; SECOND OF ALL, THAT IT WAS 
HER ACT THAT WAS DONE ON ITS FACE INTENTIONALLY OR INTENDING 
I TO CAUSE DEATH, OR DONE KNOWING THAT THE LIKELY RESULT 
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WOULD BE DEATH. IF THEY HAVE NOT MET THAT BURDEN ON ITS 
FACE THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO GO FORWARD UNDER THOSE 
THEORIES. 
NOW, WITH REGARD TO THE THIRD THEORY THAT HAS 
BEEN, THAT THE CASE HAS BEEN BOUND OVER ON, DEALS WITH 
HER INTENTION TO INFLICT, TO INFLICT A WOUND, INTENDING 
TO CAUSE SERIOUS BODILY INJURY EVIDENCING A DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE. AND IN" THAT REGARD I WOULD 
CALL THE COURT'S ATTENTION TO THE FONTANA CASE IN WHICH 
THE SUPREME COURT HAS ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF THE DEFINITION 
OF DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE. AND IT HAS SAID THAT DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE-
JUDGE YOUNG: WOULD YOU REFER ME TO THE PAGE? 
MS. WELLS: I'M LOOKING NOW AT THE HEAD NOTES 
BUT WE CAN GO FURTHER INTO IT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET'S READ FROM THE TEXT. 
MS. WELLS: ALL RIGHT. FROM THE TEXT. I WOULD 
CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO SUBSECTION (2) WHICH IS FOUND ON 
PAGE 1045. NOW--AND I'M REFERRING TO THE VERY BOTTOM OF 
THE PAGE IN WHICH IT IS STATED, "BY THEIR TERMS AND THEIR 
PLACEMENT THE WORDS DEPRAVED INOIFFERENCE REFER TO THE 
OBJECTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE CONDUCT CAUSING 
THE DEATH OCCURRED." 
THEN IT GOES ON TO INDICATE THAT THERE IS A 
SPECIFIC INTENT THAT ATTACHES TO A DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
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THEORY. AND ON PAGE 10<t6 THEY, BY PROCESS OF ELIMINATION, 
FIND THAT THERE MUST BE A KNOWING INTENT ATTACHED TO THE 
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE THEORY. IT DOESN'T COME WITHOUT 
A SPECIFIC INTENT. AND AT THE TIME OF THE FONTANA CASE 
THERE HAD BEEN NO INTERPRETATION OF THE DEPRAVED INDIFFER-
ENCE STATUTE AS IT THEN STOOD. THEY REJECT RECKLESSLY, 
THEY REJECT INTENTIONAL BUT THEY FIND THAT KNOWLEDGE OR 
KNOWINGLY IS WHAT IS APPROPRIATE. 
THEY ALSO THEN, ON PAGE 10^7, INDICATE THAT--
10 I WELL, I'M READING FROM THE BOTTOM OF 10<*6, "THAT THE DEFEN-
I! DANT," AND IN THIS CASE THE STATE, "MUST PROVE A PRIMA 
12 FACIE CASE THAT THE DEFENDANT MUST HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE 
13 NATURE OF HER CONDUCT OR THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES AND 
14 ENGAGED IN THAT CONDUCT WHICH KNOWINGLY CREATES A GRAVE 
15 RISK OF DEATH TO ANOTHER AND THEREBY CAUSES THE DEATH OF 
16 ANOTHER." 
17 NOW, I DON'T BELIEVE THE STATE HAS, AGAIN, 
IS PRESENTED ANY EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
19 SURROUNDING THE DEATH AND IF, WITHOUT THAT EVIDENCE, THEN 
20 THEY CANNOT POSSIBLY CONJECTURE AND MEET A STANDARD OF, 
21 ON ITS FACE, THAT SHE DID SOME ACT WITH DEPRAVED INDIFFER-
22 ENCE KNOWING THAT IT WAS LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH. THE SAME 
23 ARGUMENT HOLDS FOR THE INTENTIONAL AND KNOWING ASPECTS. 
24 ALSO, TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IT MUST BE THE STATE'S 
25 CONTINUAL FLOW OF EVIDENCE FROM PEOPLE WHO INDICATE THAT 
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SHE DID NOT, APPARENTLY, KNOW THAT HE HAD DIED. SHE ASKED 
IF SHE HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE. NOW, THOSE CERTAINLY WOULD 
INDICATE THAT THERE WAS NOT INTENT AND THERE WAS NOT KNOW-
LEDGE, EITHER TO SUPPORT INTENTIONAL OR KNOWING DEATH OR 
TO SUPPORT THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT OF THE DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE REQUIREMENT. 
THERE'S ALSO AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR, YOUR HONOR, 
AND THAT IS, WHAT DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE IS SUPPOSED TO 
ENCOMPASS. AND THIS IS PROBABLY A PRETTY BASIC ARGUMENT. 
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE WAS, ACCORDING TO THE CASES THAT 
ARE INVOLVED OR THAT INTERPRET IT, IS THE KIND OF SITUATION 
IN WHICH, AS WE LEARNED IN LAW SCHOOL, THE PERSON FIRES 
INTO THE CROWD OF PEOPLE. IT IS THE KIND OF CIRCUMSTANCE 
IN FONTANA WHERE THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE DEFENDANT 
DROVE UP NEXT TO ANOTHER PERSON IN AN ADJACENT CAR, TOOK 
A SHOTGUN AND FIRED INTO THE PASSING CAR. ALL RIGHT? 
THEREBY INDICATING A DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE FOR HUMAN LIFE, 
KNOWING THAT THE ACT THAT YOU ARE COMMITTING IS LIKELY 
TO CAUSE A GRAVE RISK OF DEATH. 
SO, DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE WAS NOT INTENDED TO 
ENCOMPASS THIS KIND OF SITUATION WHEREBY, EVEN UNDER THE 
BEST OF THEORIES, THAT FROM WHAT THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
SHOWS THAT THERE WAS A KNIFE EVIDENT BETWEEN TWO PERSONS. 
THAT IS NOT THE KIND OF DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE WHICH IS 
CONTEMPLATED BY THE CASES WHICH HAVE INTERPRETED IT. THE 
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1 BEST EXAMPLES I CAN GIVE ARE THE ONES I'VE GIVEN, THE PERSON 
2 WHO PLACES THE BOMB ON A CROWDED BUS, OR IN AN AMPHITHEATER 
3 FULL OF PEOPLE. IN OTHER WORDS, THEREBY KNOWING THAT HIS 
4 OR HER ACT IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN DEATH. 
5 SO I THINK THAT THE COURT SHOULD AT THIS TIME 
6 MAKE A RULING THAT DISMISSES ALL THREE OF THE STATE'S 
7 THEORIES AND THAT WOULD BE OUR MOTION AT THIS TIME, YOUR 
8 HONOR. 
9 JUDGE YOUNG: MR. YBARRA? 
10 MR. YBARRA: YOUR HONOR, THE STATE RESISTS THE 
11 MOTION, SIMPLY WOULD REMIND THE COURT THAT THE STANDARD 
12 FOR JUDGING EVIDENCE AT THIS POINT IS MERELY THAT NO REASON-
13 ABLE JUROR COULD FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY UNDER THE STATUS 
14 OF THE EVIDENCE AS IT NOW STANDS—IT'S A PRIMA FACIE 
15 STANDARD. 
16 MS. WELLS APPARENTLY CONFUSES THAT WITH SAYING 
17 THAT IF THERE'S ANY OTHER HYPOTHESIS OF INNOCENCE THEN 
15 WE CANNOT MEET THAT BURDEN. OF COURSE, THAT MAY OR MAY 
19 NOT BE A SUFFICIENT WAY OF LOOKING AT PROOF BEYOND A REASON-
20 ABLE DOUBT BUT THAT, OF COURSE, IS NOT THE STANDARD AT 
21 THE MOMENT. WHAT WE ARE LOOKING AT IS WHETHER A REASONABLE 
22 JUROR COULD FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY UNDER THE STATUS 
23 OF THE EVIDENCE AND WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL 
24 EVIDENCE AT THE VERY LEAST TO SAY THAT SUCH A JUROR COULD. 
25 WITH REGARD TO THE ELEMENTS, WE'VE PROVED THE 
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DATE, WE'VE PROVED THE VENUE, WE PROVED IT WAS THE DEFEN-
DANT, TERI LIN GODDARD, WHO WE BELIEVE CAUSED THE DEATH 
OF DEREK HALL. WE BELIEVE THAT'S BORNE OUT WITH SUBSTANTIAL 
DIRECT AS WELL AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WITH REGARD TO 
ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT AS WELL AS THE CIRCUMSTAN-
TIAL EVIDENCE OF HER HAVING POSSESSION OF THE KNIFE, CARRYING 
THE KNIFE, BEING PRESENT AT THE LOCATION, HER STATE OF 
MIND, AND SO FORTH, THAT WE BEL IEVE< THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE SHE INFLICTED THE BLOW THAT CAUSED THE DEATH OF 
DEREK HALL. 
WITH REGARD TO INTENTIONALLY AND KNOWINGLY, 
YOUR HONOR, AND WITH REGARD TO THE OTHER POTENTIAL BASES 
FOR GUILT IN THIS CASE, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE THAT A JURY COULD FIND AT THIS POINT THAT THE 
DEFENDANT, IN FACT, INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSED THE 
DEATH OF DEREK HALL. WE HAVE THE EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS 
A CONTINUING SORT OF DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE THEY WERE ENGAGED 
IN, BEGINNING EARLIER THAT EVENING, WHERE SHE WAS YELLING 
AT HIM, EVEN THREATENING TO KILL HIM IF THEY SHOULD COME 
BACK. THERE WAS SOME CONTINUATION AT THE GET-TOGETHER 
AT MR. GUTIRREZ'S WHERE SHE APPARENTLY WAS ATTEMPTING TO 
PROVOKE HIM BY PUTTING MR. GUTIRREZ'S HANDS ON HER BREASTS. 
THERE'S THE EVIDENCE THAT MR. HALL WENT TO MR. 
GUTIRREZ'S WITHOUT MS. GODDARD AND ALSO LEFT WITHOUT HER 
AT AN EARLIER TIME. 
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WE HAVE THE EVIDENCE OF MS. BETH STEED THAT 
THERE WAS APPARENTLY SOME ALTERCATION, SOME ARGUMENT THAT 
TOOK PLACE AT THE GODDARD AND HALL RESIDENCE. 
WE HAVE THE INDICATIONS FROM THE DEFENDANT HER-
SELF THAT ON THE TAPE, AT MRS. MIYATAKE'S WHERE SHE 
INDICATED, IN ESSENCE, THAT HE TRIED TO ATTACK ME AND I 
STABBED HIM AND I THINK HE'S DEAD. WELL, THAT MAY, POTEN-
TIALLY, RAISE ISSUES OF SELF-DEFE|ISE, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE 
THAT THOSE ARE ISSUES THAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE LITIGATED, 
HOWEVER, THAT INDICATES A STATE OF MIND OF THE DEFENDANT 
OF POSSIBLY INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY. 
WITH REGARD TO CAUSING SERIOUS BODILY INJURY 
WELL, OF COURSE, ANY TIME SOMEONE STABS A PERSON WITH THE 
KIND OF INSTRUMENT THAT THE DEFENDANT USED, STABS THEM 
IN THE CHEST AREA, RIGHT NEAP THE HEART, A PERSON WOULD 
HAVE TO INTEND THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THAT AND TO 
CAUSE SERIOUS BODILY INJURY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I DON'T HAVE PROBLEMS WITH "A" 
AND "B," I DO HAVE SOME PROBLEMS WITH "C." 
MR. YBARRA: WELL, YOUR HONOR, 1 BELIEVE OUR 
THEORY AS FAR AS WITH REGARD TO "C" IS SIMILAR TO "B." 
AND ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE A TRADITIONAL, PERHAPS A SORT 
OF COMMON SORT OF CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THIS THEORY MAY BE 
USED, IT IS NOT TO SAY IT'S EXCLUSIVE IN ITS APPLICATION, 
THAT AGAIN, WHEN A PERSON THRUSTS A KNIFE INTO ANOTHER 
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PERSON'S CHEST TO THE DEGREE THAT THIS KNIFE WAS THRUST, 
AND THE TYPE OF KNIFE THAT IT WAS, AND THE LOCATION IT 
WAS THRUST, THAT EVIDENCE IS A DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE TO 
HUMAN LIFE. AND SHE ENGAGED IN CONDUCT THEREBY WHICH CREATED! 
A GRAVE RISK OF DEATH TO DEREK HALL. WE BELIEVE THAT THE 
THEORY MESHES WITH THE EVIDENCE IN THAT REGARD. IT MAY 
NOT BE THE TYPICAL KIND OF CASE BUT IT IS, NEVERTHELESS, 
AN ACCEPTABLE TYPE OF THEORY. AND, THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE 
THAT AS IT WAS BOUND OVER AND AS THE EVIDENCE HAS COME 
10 I FORWARD THERE IS A BASIS BY WHICH THE JURY COULD FIND GUILT 
11 UNDER THAT THEORY. 
12 THEREFORE, YOUR HONOR, AND WITH REGARD TO MS. 
13 WELLS' COMMENTS AS TO THE STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT, 
14 I DIDN'T MEAN TO, OR DID I KILL HIM, I MEAN, THAT PERHAPS 
15 GOES TO THE WEIGHT OF THE STATE'S EVIDENCE, BUT THOSE ARE 
16 SIMPLY SELF-SERVING STATEMENTS UPON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT 
17 AND OUGHT NOT ENTER INTO THE COURT'S CALCULATION AT THIS 
18 POINT AS WHETHER THERE'S A PRIMA FACIE CASE WHETHER A REASON-I 
19 ABLE JUROR COULD FIND GUILT. 
20 MS. WELLS: YOUR HONOR, MAY I CALL THE COURT'S 
21 ATTENTION TO THE OTHER CASE? AND I'M SORRY I DIDN'T DO 
22 THAT. THE ONE ON DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE. 
23 JUDGE YOUNG: JUST A MOMENT. I'LL LET YOU DO 
24 THAT IN REBUTTAL. 
25 HAVE YOU HAD.THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE 
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1 FONTANA CASE? 
2 MR. YBARRA: YOUR HONOR, I HAVE ONLY VERY BRIEFLY 
i REVIEWED IT AS WE WENT OVER IT. I HAVEN'T GONE OVER IT 
4 IN GREAT DETAIL. MS. WELLS EARLIER TODAY GAVE ME A COPY 
5 AND I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW IT IN ANY DETAIL. 
6 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. MS. WELLS, LET ME 
7 LET YOU FINISH THAT ARGUMENT THEN. 
8 MS. WELLS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. STATE V. 
9
 STANDIFORD, WHICH I PROVIDED FOR THE COURT, WHICH WOULD 
10 BE BEHIND THE FONTANA CASE, IT ALSO DEALS WITH DEPRAVED 
11 INDIFFERENCE. AND IN THAT CASE IT FOUND THAT DEPRAVED 
12 INDIFFERENCE WAS APPROPRIATELY GIVEN TO THE JURY. AND 
13 THE FACTS OF THAT CASE WERE THAT THE DEFENDANT STABBED 
14 THE DECEDENT 107 TIMES. AND CERTAINLY, UNDER THAT SET 
15 OF FACTS, "IF YOU APPLY THAT TO THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT THAT 
16 THE ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT WERE DONE KNOWINGLY, IN CREATING 
17 A GRAVE RISK OF DEATH, AND THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW THE 
'8 RISK OF DEATH WAS GRAVE, WHICH MEANS A HIGHLY LIKELY 
19 PROBABILITY OF DEATH, THAT IS INCLUDED." AND I'M JUST 
20 READING FROM THE HEAD NOTES ON PAGE 256 OF THE TOP OF THE 
21 STANDIFORD CASE. 
22 SO THE OTHER SITUATION IS, YOUR HONOR, THAT 
23 THIS COURT IS TO MAKE LEGAL DECISIONS AND YOU, UNDER--
24 p M SORRY, I DON'T HAVE MY RULES WITH ME AT THE MOMENT--
25 BUT UNDER THE COURT RULES THE COURT HAS THE OBLIGATION 
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TO DISMISS THOSE THEORIES OR PORTIONS, OR THOSE THEORIES 
WHERE THE ELEMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN MET. AND IN THIS INSTANCE 
THE ELEMENT OF KNOWINGLY CREATING A GRAVE RISK OF DEATH 
HAS TO BE MET AT A PRIMA FACIE LEVEL. AND MY SUGGESTION 
IS, BOTH FROM THE FACTS AS IT COMPARES WITH THESE OTHER 
CASES, WHICH CLEARLY WOULD INDICATE THAT THE ACTOR CREATED 
A GRAVE RISK OF DEATH AND DID SO KNOWINGLY, THE EVIDENCE 
HEREIN DOES NOT FIT THE USUAL GENDER OF DEPRAVED INDIFFER-
ENCE CASES GENERALLY, NOR DOES IT MEET IT SPECIFICALLY. 
THERE'S ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY, ASSUMING THAT 
THE COURT FOUND THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT 
SHE WAS AN ACTOR, THEY HAD TO HAVE ALSO HAVE SHOWN THAT 
SHE WAS AN ACTOR ACTING WITH KNOWLEDGE "HAT HER ACT WAS 
LIKELY TO CREATE THIS GRAVE RISK OF DEATH. AND THAT'S 
WHAT STANDIFORD AND FONTANA HAVE SAID TOGETHER. AND I 
BELIEVE THAT THOSE CASES ARE CLEAR AND "HAT THE COURT SHOULD 
NOT ALLOW ANY FURTHER, AT LEAST THAT PORT ION--YOU'VE INDI-
CATED YOU DON'T HAVE A PROBLEM WITH "A" AND "B," SO I AM 
NOT GOING TO ADDRESS THE ARGUMENT TO THAT, BUT I DO BELIEVE 
20 I THAT THE COURT, IN READING THESE TWO DECISIONS AND UNDER-
21 STANDING DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE AND WHAT IT 
22 REQUIRES, CANNOT FIND THAT THEY HAVE ME" A PRIMA FACIE 
23 BASIS AND THE COURT IS LEGALLY BOUND, lc THEY'VE NOT MET 
24 THE ELEMENTS OF THAT, TO DISMISS AT THE END OF THE STATE'S 
25 CASE. 
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JUDGE YOUNG: MM-HMM. (YES). MR. YBARRA, DID 
YOU FINISH YOUR ARGUMENT? 
MR. YBARRA: YES, YOUR HONOR, OTHER THAN TO 
SIMPLY EMPHASIZE THAT ONE, SINGLE FACT, WHEN SOMEONE STABS 
ANOTHER IN THE CHEST THAT SHOWS A DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
FOR THE LIFE OF THAT VICTIM AND ANY RATIONAL ADULT PERSON 
KNOWS THAT. THEY ARE AWARE OF IT; THAT'S A LIKELIHOOD. 
SO, THEREFORE, WE THINK THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE THEORY 
IS A VIABLE THEORY IN THIS CASE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. WELL, THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS — ACTUALLY, I'LL TELL YOU SPECIFICALLY WHAT MY 
CONCERNS ARE IN RULING IN RELATION TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS 
IT WILL BE SPECIFICALLY DENIED AS TO ALLEGATIONS--AS TO 
"A" AND "B" OF 76-5-203 BECAUSE I SPECIFICALLY FIND THAT 
A REASONABLE JUROR COULD BELIEVE THAT THE DEFENDANT KNOWINGLt 
AND INTENTIONALLY CAUSED "HE DEATH OF ANOTHER AND/OR A 
REASONABLE JUROR COULD BE, AS IN PARAGRAPH "B," COULD FIND 
THAT THE DEFENDANT ACTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CAUSE SERIOUS 
19 I BODILY INJURY TO ANOTHER. SHE, IN THIS CASE, COMMITTED 
20 AN ACT CLEARLY DANGEROUS TO HUMAN LIFE THAT CAUSED THE 
21 DEATH OF ANOTHER. THE JURY COULD FIND EITHER "A" OR "B" 
22 AND CLEARLY ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT EVIDENCE. 
23 THE MOTION IN RELATION TO A DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
24 WILL BE TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT FOR THE COURT TO HAVE THE 
25 OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE CASES THAT YOU'VE PROVIDED TO 
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ME AND I WILL RULE ON THAT PRIOR TO SUBMITTING THE MATTER 
TO THE JURY. ALL RIGHT? 
MS. WELLS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WE'LL RECALL THE JURY. 
(WHEREUPON, THE JURY RETURNED TO THE COURTROOM). 
MS. WELLS: YOUR HONOR,<COULD WE APPROACH THE 
BENCH? 
JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY. 
(WHEREUPON, A DISCUSSION BETWEEN COURT AND COUNSEli 
WAS HELD AT THE BENCH, AFTER WHICH, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDING^ 
WERE HAD): 
MS. WELLS: YOUR HONOR, AT THIS TIME THE DEFENSE 
WOULD CALL ITS FIRST WITNESS, JAN KRAMER. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
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